Abstract Aim: The Government of Egypt has embarked on a process of reforming health care financing in the country. Under the influence of external advisers it, has so far focused on social health insurance as the main funding mechanism. Other options, in particular tax-based financing, have hardly been considered. In this article, social health insurance and taxation-based financing are analysed on their ability to meet Egypt's stated health policy goals and their viability. Subjects and methods: Review of current health care financing arrangements in Egypt, of potential areas for improvement, and of stated health policy goals. Analysis of social health insurance and taxation-based financing on their ability to meet the stated policy goals and their viability. Results: Although both funding mechanisms have distinct advantages and disadvantages when applied to the Egyptian health system, tax-based financing seems better able to meet the official policy goals of the Government of Egypt than social health insurance on grounds of efficiency, equity and technical feasibility. Conclusions: The Government of Egypt will have to raise public health expenditure substantially to finance care at an adequate level. Expanding and refining the present tax-based financing scheme, rather than switching to an insurance-based scheme seems the technically superior strategy. Other measures to improve the coordination of financing, such as the creation of a single fundholding agency, are needed as well as tighter regulation of private providers and the pharmaceutical market.
Introduction
In the 1990s, the Government of Egypt declared health a national priority and embarked on a major health sector reform programme with the main aim of testing a new social insurance model -the Family Health Fund -focused on primary care provision (Salem 2002) . For this health sector reform programme Egypt has received approximately US$500 million of foreign aid and technical assistance between the years 1996 and 2000, notably by the World Bank, USAID, and the European Commission (Salem 2002) . The health reforms envisaged by the technical advisors were heavily focused on a social health insurance model. Other options for health care financing have so far not figured prominently in publicly available documents. In this paper, funding the Egyptian health system through social insurance is compared with funding through taxation, which is the other main alternative. The feasibility of expanding private health insurance is very limited and has been dealt with elsewhere in detail (Rafeh 1997) .
The paper begins with an overview of the Egyptian health care system and its political and socioeconomic environment. Next, current issues in health care financing are highlighted and policy goals are specified. The subsequent section analyses the advantages and disadvantages of the two main alternative sources of finance, social insurance and taxation, with respect to their ability to achieve stated policy goals and their viability. Health service delivery issues are beyond the scope of this study. The paper concludes with a summary of the main findings and recommendations for a future health reform strategy in Egypt.
Background

Political and socioeconomic environment
With an estimated 68-70 million inhabitants, Egypt is the most populous country of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) (World Bank 2004a; World Health Organization 2004) . According to World Bank criteria, Egypt is a lowermiddle income country with a gross national income (Atlas method) per capita of US$1,360 in 2003 (World Bank 2004a . Currently 35% of its population are under 15 years of age, and the workforce totals 31% of the population, with roughly one third employed in agriculture and another third employed in the public sector (Ministry of Foreign Trade 2004) . At least 45% of the population are urban (The Economist 2003) . This is probably an underestimate, as many Egyptian "villages" are now the size of small towns. Other sources estimate that 60% of Egypt are now urban (The Economist 1999) .
After three decades of socialist economy and rapid economic growth, Egypt started implementing economic reforms in 1986 to counter a substantial deterioration of economic performance due to falling oil prices and economic imbalances (Rannan-Eliya et al. 1998) . In 1990 it embarked on a comprehensive structural adjustment programme. Meanwhile it has become the very model of a modern emerging market (The Economist 1999). Macroeconomic indicators are favourable: a sustained real growth rate around 4.5%, inflation below 4%, a budget deficit at 8% of GDP (from 15% in 1989), a steadily decreasing foreign debt, and foreign reserves of US$13. . However, economic reforms have also given rise to adverse social effects; namely, the aggravation of poverty and unemployment (Ali Dau and El-Amach 1997) . Measures included the reduction of government spending, elimination or reduction of subsidies on food and other goods and services, and higher taxes required to attain fiscal balance, all of which primarily affect the poor. Unemployment was primarily caused by restructuring of the public sector and privatisation (Ali Dau and El-Amach 1997) .
For the period 1990-2001, the number of poor in both urban and rural areas was estimated at 43.9%, defined as persons living below an income poverty line of US$2 per day according to UNDP criteria (UNDP 2003) . The improved income of other social groups benefiting from the reforms creates larger income discrepancies and further heightens the poverty perception of this large segment of the population (Ali Dau and El-Amach 1997).
Officially 9.9% of the workforce was unemployed in 2003, but when new graduates and 1.5 million redundant public sector employees are taken into account, effective unemployment adds up to 20% (Ali Dau and El-Amach 1997) , an estimate which has been confirmed in a recent survey (UNDP 1999) . Between 1991 and 1999, public investment in the social sector decreased steadily from 1.9% to 1.3% of GDP (Ministry of Economy 2000b). Public investment in health fell from 0.16% in 1991 to 0.04% in 1994, but has since risen to 0.23% of GDP in 1999 (Ministry of Economy 2000b . Detailed data on public expenditures are not available, but total current public expenditure decreased from 26.2% in 1994 to 19.4% of GDP in 1999 (Ministry of Economy 2000a).
There has been no political counterpart to economic liberalisation. Power remains centralised, with little authority devolved to local levels (The Economist 1999). The legal and regulatory system is a thicket of tens of thousands, sometimes contradictory, laws and decrees, dating from different periods, including Islamic, French, Ottoman, British, Soviet-inspired, and recently those favouring a globalised market economy (The Economist 1999).
Egypt's health care system Egypt has a complex health system, with many different public and private providers and financing agents. There are four main financing agents: (1) the government sector, which is understood in Egypt to refer to the various ministries and departments of the government (Rannan-Eliya et al. 1998); (2) the public sector, consisting of financially autonomous organisations owned by the government, the largest being the Health Insurance Organisation (HIO) and Curative Care Organisations (CCO); (3) private organisations, like private insurance companies, unions, professional organisations, and non-profit NGOs; and (4) households (Rafeh 1997; Rannan-Eliya et al. 1998) . Health care providers in the government sector are the Ministry of Health (MOH), teaching and university hospitals, HIO, and the Ministries of Interior and Defence. Public providers are HIO, CCO, and other public firms. CCO are autonomous organisations which have come into existence in 1964 through the privatisation of several private hospitals and which receive most of their income through contracts with private employers and from HIO (Rannan-Eliya et al. 1998) . The private sector consists of both non-profit and profit providers, such as private clinics, hospitals and pharmacies (Rannan-Eliya et al. 1998) . NGOs are currently one of the fastest growing sectors (Rafeh 1997) .
Data from the National Health Accounts programme in Egypt indicate that health spending totalled E£7.5 billion or 3.7% of GDP in 1995, equivalent to E£127 (US$38) per capita (Rannan-Eliya et al. 1998) . According to the most recent WHO estimates, both total health expenditure at 3.9% of GDP in 1997 and 2001, and government health spending per capita (US$21 in 1997 and US$22 in 2001, current exchange rates) have changed little since (World Health Organization 2004) . In 1999, public financing, mainly from general taxation, contributed 1.6%, private financing 2.1% of GDP (Rannan-Eliya et al. 1998) . In 1999 government revenues totalled 23.6% of GDP. Central tax revenues accounted for 15.6%, transferred profits for 3.2% and other, non-tax revenues for 1.8%. Local revenues accounted for 2.9%. Since 1994 total revenues have decreased steadily from 30% of GDP, and tax revenues from 17.9%, respectively (Ministry of Economy 2000a).
Social insurance, which accounted for 18% of public funding (Rannan-Eliya et al. 1998) , is mandatory for formal government and company employees, who contribute 0.5 and 1% of their base salary, and their employers 1.5 and 3%, respectively (Rafeh 1997). Five percent of funding was raised by firms, private insurance and syndicates, and 51% was spent by households (RannanEliya et al. 1998) . Sources of finance are summarised in Table 1 .
Almost all public monies passed through financial intermediaries before being transferred to providers, whereas more than 90% of household expenditures consisted of direct out-of-pocket payments to private providers and pharmacies (Rannan-Eliya et al. 1998 ). There were three major financing channels: (1) from Ministry of Finance (MOF) to MOH facilities through the MOH budget (E £1337 million); (2) from Social Insurance Organisation (E £448 million) and MOF (E£434 million) to HIO; and (3) from households (E£3780 million) directly to private providers and pharmacies (Rannan-Eliya et al. 1998) .
The use of funds at provider level is visualised in Table 2 . Less than 60% of MOF funds were actually spent in MOH facilities (Rannan-Eliya et al. 1998 ). The rest was transferred to teaching and university hospitals, HIO and CCO. MOH facilities thus only received 19% of all health sector resources, or 0.7% of GDP (Rannan-Eliya et al. 1998) . Fifty-six percent of all resources were spent in the private sector, most of it for the purchase of drugs (63%) or paying for private ambulatory care (17%). Less than 10% of private funds were used to purchase inpatient care (Rannan-Eliya et al. 1998) .
Despite the radical economic policy shift, there has been little change in the overall financing and structure of the health system since 1991. The only notable changes were the expansion of social insurance coverage to 10 million schoolchildren in 1993 (Rafeh 1997), and an increase in total health spending from 3.4 to 3.9% of GDP (RannanEliya et al. 1998; World Health Organization 2004) .
Current issues
The Egyptian health system has some strengths, such as an extensive infrastructure of physicians, clinics and hospitals, availability of technology and pharmaceuticals, and excellent physical access to care, with 95% of the population being within a 5 km reach of a medical facility (World Bank 1998). It achieved high immunisation rates and a reduction of annual population growth from 2.3% in 1990 to 2.0% in 2003 (World Bank 2004a). However, the belief that the lowering of the Egyptian birth rate is a result of the systematic extension of family planning services has been challenged. Evidence seems to suggest, that it is rather a response to the country's changing economic, social, and political circumstances (Fargues 1997) .
During the period of structural adjustment, there has been continuing concern with the government's policies in the social sector, and there has been some recognition that performance in the health sector both before and during adjustment has been less than adequate (Rannan-Eliya et al. 1998) . The Egyptian health system has been characterised as having virtually all the problems encountered in former socialist countries, while at the same time possessing few of the advantages and most of the problems of an openended, US type system (World Bank 1998).
In particular, the following problems have been identified:
▪ Health status concerns: Although substantial health improvements have occurred in the 1980s, like a reduction in child mortality and in infectious diseases (Sallam 1998), these have given way to stagnation of health conditions in the 1990s. Compared with other countries at its income level, Egypt's health indicators were and remain poor (Hertz et al. 1994; Rannan-Eliya et al. 1998) . The gap between life expectancy at birth in Egypt compared with the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) country average now nearly reaches 10 years (Schieber 2004). Healthy life expectancy, estimated at 59 years at birth in 2002, is among the lowest in the region (World Health Organization 2004). ▪ Inequity: Although in theory, the government constitutionally guarantees "free health care to all" (Rafeh 1997), there is a huge disparity in financial access to care. The burden of households on out-of-pocket spending is greater than in any other country in the MENA region, with the exception of Yemen (RannanEliya et al. 1998 ). The poor pay relatively more (both out-of-pocket and through the tax system) and receive relatively less in benefits than the better-off social strata (World Bank 1998 , 2004a . Less than 40% of the general population, and only 15% of those over 15 years of age benefit from social insurance coverage (Rafeh 1997; World Bank 1998) . Social insurance with nearly 50% contribution from general revenues resembles more a subsidised public finance scheme than 
Health policy aims
Guiding goals of any health sector reform are to improve health status and equitable access to high quality care. As these are multidimensional and notoriously difficult to measure, policies are better assessed using operational objectives (Figueras et al. 1997) . Furthermore, since policy goals can be conflicting, there is a need to set priorities (Figueras et al. 1997) .
In view of current problems, we consider the following priority objectives for successful reform of health care financing in Egypt:
▪ Improvement of efficiency at the macro and micro level, notably the ability of policies to increase revenue while maintaining expenditure control, and analysis of incentives for efficiency and quality inherent to policies. ▪ Reduction of inequity in finance and delivery, notably the ability of policies to increase coverage and to improve risk pooling through reduction of out-ofpocket expenditures, as well as their ability to meet the needs of the poor in particular.
In addition, the technical and political feasibility of policies will be assessed, notably the administrative and institutional capacity to carry out policies, and the acceptability of reforms to users, health professionals and politicians.
Possible options for reform will be judged against these criteria in the following section.
Options for reform
Health care financing options can be classified according to (1) source of finance (voluntary and compulsory/public), (2) management of finance, and (3) provider payment methods (Barnum et al. 1995; OECD 1992) . Of the many possible subsystems resulting from combinations of these mechanisms, only a few seem suitable as main components of health care financing in Egypt. As detailed above, the current system relies mainly on the combination of a voluntary, out-of-pocket model and a public integrated model. The dominant model in many OECD countries is a public contract model (OECD 1992) . This seems also a feasible option in Egypt, which not only has the potential to improve efficiency and equity of health services, but also to recycle out-of-pocket expenditures into the public system, which has been considered the greatest challenge for reform (World Bank 1998). The weaknesses and strengths of different ways of funding such a model will be analysed here. The possible role of voluntary health insurance or compulsory saving accounts in Egypt is very limited, and has been reviewed elsewhere in detail (Rafeh 1997).
Social-insurance-based financing
Macro-efficiency Compared with systems financed through general taxation, there is in general less political resistance to raising social insurance contributions (Le Grand 1998). This would make it easier for the government to increase revenue for public health spending. However, social insurance, being effectively a payroll tax, can increase labour costs (Le Grand 1998), which might not be desirable in the actual context of economic reforms and encourage the non-reporting of economic activity (Saltman and Figueras 1997) . Independence of the management of finance from government control and state budget, which is a key feature of social insurance schemes, leads to loss of governmental control of expenditure. This has proven to be particularly problematic in countries in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) and in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), who experienced an increase in costs after the introduction of social insurance and large deficits of funds, which had to be covered by the state budget (Saltman and Figueras 1997) . Some are now considering reverting to taxbased schemes (Saltman and Figueras 1997) . Likewise a number of southern European countries recently changed their finance systems from social insurance to general taxation, mainly because of difficulties to control expenditure (Mossialos and Le Grand 1999).
Micro-efficiency
In contrast to out-of-pocket payments, social insurance, like any form of third party payment mechanism, will lead to consumer moral hazard. Even under the current, low-quality HIO scheme a significant increase in utilisation is observable when compared with no insurance (Ministry of Health and Population and Harvard School of Public Health 1998b). Whether this increased use compared with a perfect market is inefficient is very controversial (Donaldson and Gerard 1993) . Provider moral hazard is frequently observed in social insurance systems (Le Grand 1998), but this is thought to be related to fee-for-service payment of providers often associated with social insurance, rather than to the funding mechanism. In general, social insurance systems deliver high-quality care (Le Grand 1998), but this might essentially be due to the fact that it is the system employed in the world's richest countries with high overall spending on health care and high living standards. Competition between providers and even between funds can be incorporated in the design of such a system, when consumer choice of provider and/or fund is given and money follows patients. If competition between multiple funds is permitted, care has to be taken to prevent risk selection by funds and adverse selection by consumers. Administrative costs are likely to be higher than for a tax-based financing scheme.
Equity According to the ability to pay principle, social insurance systems tend to be equitable to a certain extent, as contributions are usually related to income (Le Grand 1998). However, most social insurance systems fund health care in a regressive way, since contributions are calculated as a flat percentage of salary and there is often a ceiling, resulting in comparatively lower contributions for the better-off (Saltman and Figueras 1997) . In Europe, no social-insurance-financed system has achieved complete universal coverage, since cover follows entitlement based on some criterion relating to contributions (Saltman and Figueras 1997) . Thus, inequality of access is present, and especially targeting the poor, which should be a priority for Egypt, is not a strength of these systems. In addition, in some countries with multiple insurance funds benefits vary between funds (Saltman and Figueras 1997), which is counter to the principle of equal care for equal need.
Feasibility In all insurance-financed systems, ways have to be found to cover non-contributing individuals. This is likely to be an important obstacle to social insurance funding in Egypt, as for every contributing individual working in the formal sector, there are five non-contributing individuals. According to a Labour Force Sample Survey from 1994, those who were privately employed outside establishments constituted 60% of the total workforce in urban areas (UNDP 1999).
It is worth noting that under the current HIO scheme even close dependants are not eligible (Rafeh 1997). Even in high-income countries using social insurance financing schemes, 20-40% of total health care spending is funded through the state budget from general taxation (Saltman and Figueras 1997) . Payment compliance problems are likely to arise as a result of the increased financial burden on state and private employers. In many CEE and CIS countries, large arrears in social insurance contributions have been accumulated by employers (Saltman and Figueras 1997) . The consequence of this has been a tendency to re-centralise social health insurance. For example in Poland, the 17 regional sickness funds that have just come into existence in 1999 have been abolished in 2003 and replaced by a single National Health Fund. Administrative capacity to manage a social-insurance scheme in Egypt is considered limited (World Bank 1998), and lack of adequate information systems, lack of technical expertise in insurance management, lack of institutional infrastructure and an inadequate regulatory framework may further impede viability of insurance-based financing in Egypt. For example, 95% of small enterprises, which employ 75% of the non-agricultural labour force, do not have bank accounts (The Economist 1999). In contrast to its weak technical feasibility, social insurance is likely to be highly acceptable to better-off citizens and politicians in favour of current economic reforms for its dissimilarity to previous state financing, and to health care professionals because of expected higher earnings.
Tax-based financing
Macro-efficiency Health system financing through general taxation tends to restrict the overall level of health care funding to one below the level generated by social insurance (Le Grand 1998). With respect to cost containment and the expected rise of health care costs, this can be considered a clear advantage. However, raising revenue for health purposes may be more difficult, as taxpayers seem more resistant to increases in general taxes compared with insurance contributions earmarked for health (Le Grand 1998) . This could partly be compensated by the introduction of complementary, hypothecated taxes on income or consumption.
Micro-efficiency Addressing the fragmentation of Egyptian financing and organisational structures seems easier under a tax-based scheme than under insurance-based financing. Quality issues traditionally considered associated with finance through the state budget, notably the lack of incentives for efficiency, can partly be overcome by introducing quasi-market mechanisms like a purchaser-provider split, by allowing competition between providers, and by devolving financial autonomy to local units. The quality issue is also influenced by the fact that countries with health care financing through general taxation mostly follow a public integrated model, and efficiency problems encountered in these systems may rather be related to public provision of services than to the finance mechanism. Administrative costs are likely to be lower than under an insurance-based scheme.
Equity In contrast to insurance-based systems, entitlement is based on citizenship or residence, and universal coverage as well as risk pooling is generally achieved in countries with tax-based health funding (Saltman and Figueras 1997) . The equitable distribution of the financial burden according to the ability to pay principle will depend on the progressivity of the overall taxation system (Le Grand 1998). Funding from direct taxes is usually progressive (Wagstaff 1992) . In contrast, indirect taxes are mildly regressive (Rutten 1993) . For earmarked taxes, opportunities to modify equity characteristics of the financing system are greater than for general taxation, as policies to change the latter effect the whole tax system (Rutten 1993). In general, formal financial barriers to care do not exist in tax-financed systems which contribute to equity on the delivery side (Le Grand 1998). Targeting the poor in designing such a system seems easier than in an insurance-based system. However, with less funds available for the overall system, rationing of services may be more prominent, and can contribute to discrimination of special groups, especially the poor rural population (Le Grand 1998).
Feasibility The technical feasibility of a tax-based finance system is excellent, as such a system is already in place and both the administrative and institutional capacity to administer such a scheme are present. The political feasibility depends on the acceptability of the taxes. Earmarking taxes for health purposes can increase acceptability to contributors (Le Grand 1998) . Furthermore, the tax burden has steadily been reduced since 1994 by 2.3% of GDP (Ministry of Economy 2000a). Thus raising taxes is likely to be more acceptable than in countries where taxes have recently been increased. Acceptability to politicians will be mixed, but in view of a current tendency to counterbalance or slow the market-oriented reforms sticking to tax-based health care financing may be more acceptable than introducing a new scheme.
Conclusions
An analysis of the two main financing options for health care in Egypt-taxation and social insurance-clearly favours taxation on technical grounds of efficiency, equity, and feasibility. We would therefore recommend to expand and refine the present tax-based finance scheme, rather than to switch to an insurance-based scheme, as has been recommended by other organisations (Partnerships for Health Reform 1999; World Bank 1998). To address some of the health care financing issues reviewed, the Government of Egypt will have to raise public health expenditure substantially to finance care at an adequate level. Increasing revenue will be a major challenge, and could be addressed by expanding the use of hypothecated taxes in addition to the existing, minimal sin tax on tobacco products. The current mandatory social insurance scheme for formal workers could be continued alongside to finance the public scheme, but separate provision and associated privileges should be discontinued since they decrease the solidarity of the overall scheme and lead to inefficiency of provision in both public and social insurance facilities demonstrated by the current low occupancy rates in both types of facilities. Additional measures related to the source of finance will be needed, like a discontinuation of the current policy to allow companies to opt out of the social insurance scheme. In order to maintain the better-off contributors in the public financing scheme, only complementary voluntary insurance should be permitted.
User charges in the public sector should be kept at a minimum, since they represent the most regressive form of health care financing and since they are not a very powerful policy tool to improve efficiency nor to contain costs (Saltman and Figueras 1997) , and exempting the poor is very difficult (Abel-Smith 1994) . If permitted at all, facilities should be allowed to retain them to improve quality of services (Litvack and Bodart 1993) . Out-of-pocket payments in the private sector should be regulated and ways should be sought to replace them in the long run by other provider payment methods, e.g. capitation, under a public contract model.
Increasing health expenditure and reform of sources of funding alone will of course not be sufficient to address all issues raised. The management of finance has to be better coordinated, which could be achieved by creating a single, fundholding agency with greater purchasing power. Ways have to be found to bind private providers into the public finance system, possibly through a public contract model, in order to recycle the large amount of out-of-pocket expenditures into the public system and to create incentives for efficiency and quality, e.g. through changes in provider payment methods. A step in the right direction has been made by the accreditation programme for primary care facilities and hospitals, which has been developed and tested in the pilot projects of the health reform programme (Salem 2002) . Other politically more difficult accompanying measures, such as divesting inefficient public facilities, abolishing employment guarantees for doctors and nurses, limiting medical school enrolment, introducing quality assurance mechanisms, and tighter regulation of the pharmaceutical market, are equally important.
Furthermore, health sector reforms cannot be seen in isolation. Other important determinants of health, such as education, health promotion, safe water and sanitation, housing and traffic regulations have to be developed in order to achieve a significant impact on population health. This is particular important, as Egypt's achievements in these areas have remained below expectations. Currently around 44% of adults aged over 15 are illiterate (UNDP 2003) , more than 50% of men smoke (Schieber 2004) , and about 50% of men and 70% of women are obese (Popkin et al. 2002) . Although 97% of rural areas are supplied with sources of drinking water, the provision of sanitary drainage facilities is still inadequate in 93% of these areas (Food and Agriculture Organization 1996) , and road traffic accident rates in the MENA region have the highest growth rate in the world (Schieber 2004).
In conclusion, social insurance does not solve the fundamental problems in the Egyptian health system, notably the inefficient and inequitable spending of public funds and systems of political governance which underfinance health services and create the wrong incentives for providers and purchasers of care. These are common issues in many low and middle income countries, and under such conditions even the best-designed social insurance system will fail (Savedoff 2004). To be successful, future health sector reforms have to focus on the fundamental problems in the Egyptian health system instead and have to be embedded in a wider strategy to tackle the socio-economic determinants of health. 
